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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution guarantees all defendants 
access to a fair and impartial criminal justice system.1  To 
ensure that non-English speaking defendants have access to 
this fair and impartial criminal justice system, language access 
and effective assistance is imperative.  From becoming familiar 
with how to file a claim, to the importance of accurate and 
adequate communications between client and attorney, the 
scope for constitutional concern is plethoric.  The Sixth 
Amendment, for example, entitles defendants to, amongst 
other things, effective assistance of counsel for his or her 
defense.2  How can counsel be effective if he or she does not 
speak the same language as his or her client?  Is it possible to 
establish a consistent method of legal access for foreign 
language petitioners in habeas corpus cases? 
In order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel, counsel and client must be able to 
effectively communicate with each other.3  For counsel and 
client to be able to communicate in circumstances where the 
client speaks a foreign language, counsel bears a greater 
burden of ensuring that communication is effective and that 
the client is confident that he or she understands and is 
understood.4  This, in effect, ensures that counsel adheres to 
effective assistance as required by the Sixth Amendment. 
There is no clear or consistent authority on foreign 
language access issues in the context of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  As a result, future litigants have little guidance in 
terms of how best to approach other foreign language issues 
going forward.  These issues are herein illustrated primarily 
by the habeas cases of Mendoza v. Carey,5 Yang v. Archuleta,6 
and United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones.7  Ultimately, whilst 
some procedural safeguards have been implemented to protect 
 
1 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012); see also ABA/SCLAID 
Providing Services to Language Minority Clients, Equal Justice Conference 
2006, NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, at 14 (2006). 
4 Id. 
5 Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). 
6 Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2008). 
7 United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones, No. 07 C 6099, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
121919 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2008). 
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language minorities in the courtroom, such as specific training 
and selection of interpreters at the federal level,8 these 
safeguards are not enough and certainly do not cure lost-in-
translation attorney-client communications more generally. 
This article starts by articulating the test under 
Strickland v. Washington, before turning to language access 
habeas cases and language interpretation to demonstrate the 
inadequate state of language access in the legal system.  The 
article concludes by reiterating the importance of safeguards 
for clients who speak foreign languages inside and outside the 
courtroom and provides some recommendations to assist in 
implementing necessary safeguards. 
I. TEST UNDER STRICKLAND 
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington established a two-prong test to govern ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.9  For a defendant to obtain 
reversal of a conviction or to vacate a sentence based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show that: (1) 
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unreasonable performance, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.10  This second prong is 
the prejudice standard.11 
The Supreme Court has also held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to 
pre-trial proceedings.12  “It guarantees a defendant the right to 
have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal 
proceedings.”13  The Court has expressly stated that critical 
stages include “the entry of a guilty plea.”14  The Sixth 
Amendment right must extend beyond pre-trial proceedings to 
also include access to said proceedings.  How can effective 
assistance be adhered to only during legal proceedings and not 
encapsulate the very first attorney-client encounter?  It is 
submitted that the right is violated if effective assistance is not 
 
8 Appointment of interpreters for non-English speakers, as well as specific 
training and selection, is mandated under 28 U.S. Code § 1827. 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). 
13 U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28. 
14 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31, 34 (1972). 
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adhered to from entry to exit in the context of the criminal 
justice system.  Effective assistance must be on a continuum of 
an immigrant’s experience with the criminal justice system—
not just during legal proceedings.  One obvious example of 
where such assistance must be recognized is in relation to 
habeas claims. 
II. HABEAS CORPUS CLAIMS FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
SPEAKING PETITIONERS 
Habeas claims, made via writ of habeas corpus, provide a 
crucial last-ditch attempt for litigants to obtain relief in the 
criminal justice system.  They are federal claims often 
challenging unconstitutional incarceration, alleged in 
circumstances where all remedies in state court have been 
exhausted.15  The stakes, therefore, are high for habeas 
petitioners.  Relatively recent case law only illustrates the tip 
of the iceberg concerning problems associated with foreign 
language access to habeas claims and access to the justice 
system more broadly.16  The trend has been that most courts 
have denied the right to access legal materials generally, as 
well as specifically denying access to legal materials in a 
foreign language.17  These circumstances can be seen in the 
context of equitable tolling.  The case of Mendoza v. Carey, has 
been the most discussed case on this issue, namely because it 
“[came] out of left field,”18 distinguished itself from the steady 
accord of case law denying access to legal materials, and gave 
new hope to foreign language habeas petitioners.19 
This section provides a high-level chronology of case law 
in the context of equitable tolling. It highlights that the Ninth 
Circuit currently stands alone in protecting access to habeas 
through its interpretation of extraordinary circumstance as an 
equitable tolling requirement.  It more broadly stresses the 
need for case-by-case application in circumstances where a 
non-English speaker seeks access to legal materials and to the 
legal system. 
 
15 See Megan Grandinetti, Ensuring Access to Justice for Non-English-Speaking 
Criminal Defendants: Denial of Access to Other-Language Legal Materials or 
Assistance As an Extraordinary Circumstance for Equitable Tolling, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2008). 
16 See Mendoza, supra note 5; Yang, supra note 6; Sanchez, supra note 7. 
17 Jay W. Spencer, Habeas Corpus Law in the Ninth Circuit After Mendoza v. 
Carey: A New Era?, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2008). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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A. The facts and findings in Mendoza 
In 2006, petitioner Mendoza filed a writ of habeas corpus 
claiming that lack of access to Spanish-language legal 
materials prevented him from learning about filing deadlines 
under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(1996) (AEDPA) and therefore prevented his timely filing.20  
The elements Mendoza was required to establish to satisfy 
equitable tolling were that: (1) he had been pursuing his rights 
diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in 
his way.21  As to the first element, Mendoza claimed that he 
requested Spanish-language legal material when he was first 
incarcerated but was told “to wait until he got to his regular 
assigned prison.”22  Once he had arrived at his regular assigned 
prison, Mendoza claimed to have made several trips to the 
library but found only English-language materials and 
English-speaking librarians.23  Mendoza eventually found a 
newly-arrived, bilingual inmate who was willing to offer 
assistance to Mendoza in filing his habeas petition.24  As to the 
second element, Mendoza alleged that the prison’s law library’s 
lack of Spanish-language materials and his inability to obtain 
translation assistance before the requisite time deadline 
constituted extraordinary circumstances.25  The Ninth Circuit 
Court agreed and remanded the matter for appropriate 
development on the record.26 
The Court was, however, quick to reinforce the principle 
that equitable tolling may be justified if language barriers 
“actually prevent timely filing” but that a petitioner’s language 
limitations generally do not justify equitable tolling.27  In Kane 
v. Espitia the Supreme Court held that a petitioner in jail 
awaiting trial did not have a clearly established right under 
federal law to access a law library as required for federal 
habeas relief.28  The Mendoza Court expressly narrowed its 
decision to cases involving equitable tolling, rather than the 
actual grant of habeas relief for a constitutional violation.29  
 
20 Mendoza, supra note 5, at 1067. 
21 Id. at 1068.  
22 Id. at 1067.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 1069.  
25 Id.  
26 Mendoza, 449 F.3d, at 1071. 
27 Id. at 1069-70. 
28 Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005).  
29 Mendoza, supra note 5, at 1070-71. 
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This, in effect, allowed the Court to sidestep the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kane and grant relief in this instance. 
Conversely, in Yang v. Archuleta the court did not grant relief, 
and in doing so, reverted the issue of language access back to 
a strict approach, whereby no right of access to legal material 
nor foreign language-material was recognized.30 
B. The facts and findings in Yang 
In April 2008, based on similar facts, the Tenth Circuit 
Court in Yang31 declined to follow Mendoza.32  Yang filed a 
habeas writ and the district court ordered him to show cause 
as to why his petition should not be denied because it was not 
filed within the one-year limitation period under AEDPA.33  
Amongst other things, Yang urged equitable tolling due to his 
lack of English-language proficiency.34  The district court 
rejected the argument, stating that it did not consider 
“difficulty with the English-language sufficient to warrant 
equitable tolling.”35 
The Court held that Yang did not allege with specificity 
“the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal claims”36 and 
that he did not “set forth what actions he pursued to secure 
assistance with his language barrier inside or outside prison 
boundaries.”37  Yang had also alleged that his attorney for the 
state court appeal did not inform him of the filing deadline and 
he was not able to find an inmate to help him in time.38  The 
court held that Yang’s “conclusory statement”—that he 
“diligently pursued his rights and remedies”—did not suffice.39  
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones, No. 07 C 
6099, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121919 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2008), 
petitioner Sanchez did not frame his claims with the specificity 
required for equitable tolling relief, so the court rejected 
petitioner’s argument.40  The Sanchez decision is yet another 
recent example of the pushback from Mendoza at all levels of 
 
30 Yang, supra note 6, at 929-30. 
31 Id. at 927. 
32 Id. at 929. 
33 Id. at 927. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Yang, 525 F.3d at 930. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 928-29. 
39 Id.  
40 Sanchez, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
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the judicial system. 
C. The facts and findings in Sanchez 
In July 2008, the Northern District Court of Illinois in 
United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones41 followed in Yang’s 
footsteps and rejected Mendoza.42  The District Court in 
Sanchez was, however, bound by the decision in Montenegro v. 
United States.43  “In Montenegro, the Seventh Circuit held that 
a pro se prisoner who could ‘speak little English’ and filed an 
untimely habeas petition was not entitled to equitable tolling 
due to the language barrier, his attorney’s failure to respond to 
his letters, the prisoner’s lack of legal knowledge, and delays 
caused by a transfer between prisons.”44  On this basis, the 
court rejected Sanchez’s claim.45 
Petitioner Sanchez alleged that he did not understand the 
tolling rules and that his state court counsel did not explain 
the relevant rules to him.46  Sanchez also contended that 
Spanish was his first language and that he needed to have 
legal matters communicated in Spanish to understand them 
fully.47  In response to the first claim, the court stated that 
Sanchez did not claim unawareness of the filing deadline, or 
that he was unable to secure translation assistance “despite 
timely and diligent efforts to do so.”48  The court therefore 
viewed Sanchez’s claim as a general language barrier claim,49 
and held that it was insufficient to support equitable tolling.50  
In response to the second claim, the court stated that Sanchez 
“never intimated that he was unable to obtain any translation 
assistance despite diligent, consistent efforts to do so before the 
limitations period expired.”51  The court acknowledged the 
“slightly more lenient approach” taken by the court in Mendoza 
and Yang, though sharply discounted these cases as 
 
41 Id. at 6-7. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Id. at 7-8. 
46 Sanchez, supra note 7. 
47 Id. at 2.  
48 Id. 
49 Id.  “[Sanchez] simply contends that he is pro se, has a limited education and 
limited literacy, and thus should be able to proceed despite his mistake.” 
50 Id. at 4. 
51 Id. at 7. 
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inconsistent with Seventh Circuit authority.52 
D. Lessons learned from Mendoza, Yang and Sanchez 
Has Mendoza set a new trend, or will the courts continue 
to downplay its application in subsequent cases?  In other 
words, will foreign language speaking petitioners continue to 
be denied access to legal materials in their own language?  It 
has been suggested that the court in Mendoza “demonstrated 
a proper use of equitable tolling,” and that its approach to 
ensuring equal access to habeas claims “properly reflects the 
writ’s important role in protecting the rights of prisoners.”53  
The Mendoza decision sets a factual standard by which foreign 
language prisoners can measure their claims against 
considering whether to pursue litigation.  It is submitted that 
this standard requires conscientious scrutiny of the facts of 
each case before applying the law in a way that is consistent 
with upholding a petitioner’s Constitutional rights, including 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.  However, the cases 
subsequent to Mendoza bring this standard into question and, 
effectively put prisoners back at square one.  It is true that 
prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings,54 and broader application of Mendoza 
may “place an increased burden on judicial resources.”55  
However, the importance of factually distinguishing English-
language-based habeas claims from foreign language-based 
habeas claims must be addressed to ensure access not only to 
the courts, but to effective assistance of counsel.  Congruent 
with other scholars’ views, Mendoza strikes a sound balance 
between the protection of the right of equal access to the writ 
of habeas corpus and prevention of overburdening judicial 
resources56 by adhering to a strict fact-based analysis.  
Therefore, the factual inquiry and subsequent application in 
Mendoza is reasonable and provides some necessary guidance. 
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE ART OF 
INTERPRETATION   
What role does effective assistance of counsel play in the 
 
52 Sanchez, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
53 Spencer, supra note 17, at 1016. 
54 Sanchez, supra note 7, at 3; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991). 
55 Spencer, supra note 17, at 1016. 
56 Id.  
2016] NO HABLAMOS HABEAS 711 
need for interpreters?  In order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment 
right, it is imperative that counsel and client are able to 
effectively communicate.57  For counsel and client to be able to 
communicate in circumstances where the client speaks a 
foreign language, it is axiomatic that counsel bears a greater 
burden of ensuring that communication is effective and that 
the client is confident that he or she understands and is 
understood.58  This, in effect, ensures that counsel adheres to 
effective assistance as required by the Sixth Amendment. 
This section highlights the importance of access to 
adequate interpretation at all stages of the legal system, not 
just upon reaching court.  The fact that interpretation services 
are only guaranteed in court is a gross denial of fundamental 
rights and often results in miscommunication and 
misunderstanding.  A client’s entry into the criminal justice 
system and pre-proceeding consultation must be better 
acknowledged across the United States. 
A. Interpretation is a complex process which requires 
specialized knowledge, skill and competence 
Interpretation is not simply interpreting from one 
language to another and back again.59  Rather, interpretation 
is a complex, rapid process which requires specialized 
knowledge, skill, ethics, and competence.60  There are different 
modes of interpreting61 which require distinctly different skill 
sets.  For example, simultaneous interpretation “involves the 
interpreter’s rendering into the foreign language whatever is 
being said in English, involving no pauses on the part of the 
English speaker.”62  Consecutive interpretation, which is 
frequently used for witness testimony, involves a speaker’s 
pausing at regular intervals to allow the interpreter to render 
his or her speech into the target language, aloud for everyone 
in the courtroom to hear.63  Thus, the speaker and the 
 
57 See Frye, supra note 3, at 1402. 
58 See id. 
59 Luz M. Molina, Language Access to Louisiana Courts: A Failure to Provide 
Fundamental Access to Justice, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 11 (2008). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 12. 
62 Id. (citing SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM: COURT 
INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 38 (1990)).  “This is the mode used at 
the counsel table, whereby the interpreter interprets for the defendant or 
litigant what the attorneys, judge, and English-speaking witnesses are saying.” 
63 Id. at 12. 
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interpreter take turns and no overlapping speech should be 
heard.  This mode of interpreting is typically used for foreign 
language witness testimony, rendering the testimony in 
English for the court, and interpreting the attorney’s and 
judge’s questions into the foreign language for the benefit of 
the witness.  “Everything rendered in English by the 
interpreter is recorded for the court, whereas none of the 
foreign language testimony or questions rendered by the 
interpreter in the foreign language is recorded by the court 
reporter.”64 
Summary interpretation is reserved for technical legal 
language and: 
involves distilling or condensing what has been said in the 
source language not the target language. This mode of 
interpreting is to be kept to a minimum in court 
interpreting, and is restricted to interpreting highly 
technical legal language, language that would be difficult 
to follow even for a native speaker of English.65 
In addition to possessing the requisite skill level in the 
foreign language, the interpreter must understand and be able 
to appropriately interpret formal legal English, standard 
English, colloquial English and other sub-cultural varieties.66 
These modes provide a high-level snapshot of the 
complexity of interpretation and the level of interpretation 
needed at all stages of the criminal justice process to ensure 
that the client is understood and that counsel is performing 
effectively.  It is clear from the complexities raised that 
 
64 Id. 
65 Molina, supra note 59, at 12-13. 
66 Id. at 13 (quoting BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 49, at 19). ‘Formal Legal 
Language’ is: ‘the variety of spoken language used in the courtroom that most 
closely parallels written legal language; used by the judge in instructing the 
jury, passing judgment, and ‘speaking to the record’; used by lawyers when 
addressing the court, making motions and requests, etc.; linguistically 
characterized by lengthy sentences containing much professional jargon and 
employing a complex syntax.’  ‘Standard English’ is the ‘variety of spoken 
language typically used in the courtroom by lawyers and most witnesses; 
generally labeled CORRECT English and closely paralleling that taught as the 
standard in American classrooms; characterized by a somewhat more formal 
lexicon than that used in everyday speech.’  ‘Colloquial English’ is a: ‘variety of 
language spoken by some witnesses and a few lawyers in lieu of standard 
English; closer to everyday, ordinary English in lexicon and syntax; tends to 
lack many attributes of formality that characterize standard English; used by a 
few lawyers as their particular style or brand of courtroom demeanor.’  
‘Subcultural Varieties’ include the ‘language spoken by segments of the society 
who differ in speech style and mannerisms from the larger community’.  
2016] NO HABLAMOS HABEAS 713 
communication for non-English speakers is paramount upon 
entry into the criminal justice system, and it should therefore 
alert practitioners to a heightened duty under the Sixth 
Amendment. 
B. The “front-end” of effective assistance of counsel — the 
foreign language speaking client’s entry into the 
criminal justice system and pre-proceeding 
consultation 
Language barriers faced by foreign language speakers and 
immigrants is intensified in the legal process, particularly 
where cases can directly impact a person’s liberty, such as is 
the case in habeas claims.67  State laws generally do not view 
the need for interpretation as constitutionally necessary to 
meet due process standards,68 and, therefore, a number of 
states have not developed standards for the selection and 
appointment of interpreters.69  At the federal level, 
appointment of interpreters for non-English speakers, as well 
as specific training and selection, is mandated under 28 U.S. 
Code § 1827.  However, these measures only apply to judicial 
proceedings and do not address entry into the criminal justice 
system, including initial consultation with counsel.70 
More broadly, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 
1.4 requires effective and competent communication between 
attorney and client, reasonable consultation with the client, 
keeping the client reasonably informed, and providing 
information to the client and explaining information necessary 
to make informed decisions.71  In terms of communication with 
Limited English Proficient clients, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants has stated, amongst other things, that: 
a) [c]lear communication between the practitioner and 
client is at the core of effective practice.72 
b) [i]n order for . . . practitioners to meet their professional 
responsibilities to provide competent representation to the 
client . . . the practitioner either needs to communicate in 
the client’s language directly or through a competent 
 
67 See Molina, supra note 59, at 2. 
68 Id. at 2–3. 
69 Id. at 3. 
70 28 U.S.C. § 1827. 
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4. (1983). 
72 ABA/SCLAID, supra note 3, at 3.  
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interpreter.  This responsibility attaches both to persons 
who speak a language other than English and to persons 
who rely on American Sign Language (ASL) to 
communicate.73 
c) [p]ractitioners should not leave the decision as to the 
need for or the securing of an interpreter to their clients’ 
discretion.74 
While the use of bilingual staff to assist in language 
communication may at times be appropriate, informal and 
untrained interpreters should not be used and the use of family 
and friends as interpreters is discouraged.75 In any event, it is 
not best practice.76  The provider should: 
[A]void the use of informal or untrained interpreters, 
including family members and friends of the person being 
served. . . Use of family and friends to interpret gives rise 
to serious risks that the interpretation will not be neutral 
and that the interpreter will not fully understand or be able 
to translate the legal options available.  Furthermore, there 
may be times when the person doing the interpreting will 
have an unexpected conflict with the person being served 
by the provider.77 
The California guidelines state, amongst other things, 
that “adequate communication is necessary in order to render 
‘competent’ legal services.”78  Therefore, it is evident that some 
sort of formal qualification in the relevant language is 
necessary to be able to adequately interpret for the purposes of 
providing legal services.  Bilingualism is not sufficient for court 
interpreting.79  It undermines the right to effective assistance 
at the consultation and pre-trial stages.  Alternatively, in the 
event that counsel needs to use informal or untrained 
interpreters, it is submitted that there is a duty to properly vet 
them in some other way comparable to that of certified 
interpreters. 
C. The “back-end” of effective assistance of counsel — case 
consequences and post-conviction mechanisms for 
 
73 Id.  
74 Id. (citing Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Opinion 1995–
12, Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, July 6, 1995, page 8). 
75 Id. at 25.  
76 Molina, supra note 47, at 2.  
77 Id.  
78 ABA/SCLAID, supra note 3, at 16. 
79 Molina, supra note 59, at 11. 
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claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for immigrant 
defendants 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are different where 
the client is an immigrant and/or foreign language speaker.  
The severe consequences of communication breakdown at this 
level come to life in such cases.  This occurs because in every 
guilty plea entered by the non-English speaking defendant, the 
trial court should determine whether trial counsel—most often 
not Spanish speaking—disclosed every fact material to 
accused’s decision to waive jury trial and plead guilty.  This 
goes beyond a general question posed as to whether the 
defendant understands that he is pleading guilty because this 
conclusory inquiry does not address counsel’s disclosures and 
performance in advising the client on the exercise of his jury 
trial right.  This is a right personal to the accused which cannot 
be exercised by counsel as a matter of his professional 
judgment.80  Unfortunately, Spanish speaking defendants with 
allegedly defective pleas have not been able to withdraw their 
guilty pleas.81  Thus ineffective assistance of counsel habeas 
petitions are the last resort for these defendants. 
Beyond language and language access deficiencies 
highlighted above in the cases of Mendoza, Yang and Sanchez, 
the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky addressed 
ineffective assistance regarding potential immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea in circumstances where counsel 
failed to provide affirmative and competent legal advice.82  
D. Padilla and the danger of ineffective assistance for 
immigrant defendants 
 The facts in Padilla illustrate the danger of ineffective 
assistance for immigrant defendants. Padilla had lived in the 
United States as a permanent resident for over 40 years before 
pleading guilty to drug-related charges in Kentucky.83  As a 
 
80 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
81 See United States v. Carillo-Guzman, 242 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 2000); (“Given 
Carillo-Guzman’s answers to the questions contained in his petition to plead 
guilty and posed at the change-of-plea hearing, as well as the availability of a 
Spanish interpreter before the hearing and the presence of two interpreters at 
the hearing, we are confident Carillo-Guzman understood the proceeding.”); see 
United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 186 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1999); see also 
United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2014). 
82 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
83 Id.at 356. 
716 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:56 
result of his guilty plea, Padilla faced deportation.84  In post-
conviction proceedings, Padilla claimed that his counsel failed 
to advise him of the deportation consequences before he 
entered the guilty plea.85  Padilla also claimed that counsel told 
him that he did not have to worry about immigration status 
since he had lived in this country for so long.”86  The Court held 
that it had “little difficulty” concluding that Padilla had 
sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally 
deficient because counsel had to inform Padilla that his plea 
carried a risk of deportation.87  The decision stands out as a 
significant safeguard for immigrant defendants, particularly 
because any person with a conviction that had not yet become 
final before the decision in Padilla on March 31, 2010 was 
automatically and immediately entitled to take advantage of 
the court’s holding.88 
Padilla also raised the issue of “how defense counsel is to 
determine what immigration consequences are clear or unclear 
for purposes of fulfilling their Sixth Amendment advisement 
duty.”89  It has been said that “some immigration consequences 
may be unclear due to a lack of established case law, a split in 
interpretation by courts, or vagueness that may result from 
specialized definitions and terms of art in immigration law.”90  
It can also be noted that some language access consequences 
may be unclear for identical reasons.  For example, Mendoza 
provides narrow relief strictly in the context of equitable 
tolling and undeniably only in the Ninth Circuit.  The case is 
not a Supreme Court authority and has been challenged in 
other circuits, illustrated by Yang and Sanchez, creating a split 
in interpretation and therefore providing no steady guidance 
for future litigants. 
E. Broader constitutional concerns 
Language access claims and immigration-related claims 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 359. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 374. 
88 Jeffrey L. Fisher & Kendall Turner, The Retroactivity of Padilla After Chaidez 
v. United States, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2013, at 43 (explaining that the Court in 
Chaidez v. United States held that the decision in Padilla does not generally 
apply retroactively). 
89 Hans Meyer, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Duty of Defense Counsel Representing 
Noncitizen Clients, 40 COLO. LAW. 37, 41 (2011). 
90 Id. 
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more broadly raise a number of related constitutional issues.  
Among them is the issue that the fates of noncitizen 
defendants in immigration-related claims “often depend on 
criminal defense counsel, who may well be the only line of 
immigration defense for their clients, because indigent 
noncitizens are not constitutionally entitled to appointed 
counsel in immigration proceedings.”91  The success of 
language access claims raised on habeas or appeal often also 
depend on criminal defense counsel though this, too, is 
hindered by petitioners having no constitutional right to 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings.92  Meyer writes: 
[I]mmigration consequences of a particular offense often 
become clear by developing a few critical issues related to 
the case. . . immigration status is a critical issue to consider 
because immigration law does not subject all noncitizens to 
one unified set of consequences.  Whether different criminal 
grounds of immigration law will apply often depends on a 
client’s specific immigration status and when it was 
obtained.  Thus, understanding an individual client’s 
immigration history and status in many cases will serve to 
clarify both the immigration consequences that apply and 
the duty to advise about them.93 
Similarly, it can be said that language access 
consequences often become clear by developing a few critical 
issues related to the case.  We have started to see this in cases 
such as Mendoza.  Language access is an even more critical 
issue to consider because not all clients will be subject to one 
unified set of consequences, unlike codified mandatory 
immigration consequences.  The extent and relevance of 
foreign language access can only be determined on a case-by-
case basis.  Thus, understanding an individual client’s 
language, language history and language status in many cases 
will serve to clarify both the consequences that apply and the 
requisite duty counsel must meet in order to appropriately 
advise them. 
CONCLUSION 
It is imperative that counsel understand their duty under 
the Sixth Amendment in the context of foreign language access 
 
91 Id. at 37. 
92 See Sanchez, supra note 7; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-
57 (1991). 
93 Meyer, supra note 89, at 41. 
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and advise his or her clients accordingly from day one through 
to case completion.  This heightened duty also applies to 
counsel in later circumstances where habeas claims can be 
made and appeals filed, despite there being no constitutional 
right to counsel on appeal.  The right to counsel does not mean 
that a lesser or more relaxed constitutional standard of 
effective assistance applies, particularly where foreign 
language speakers are concerned. 
Language access claims have a significant impact on a 
person’s constitutional rights and therefore more must be done 
to adequately address the needs of immigrants and foreign 
language speaking clients.  Lessons learned thus far suggest 
that three key procedural mechanisms be considered in pursuit 
of fair and impartial access to the justice system.  First, 
qualified interpreters must be obtained in some capacity at the 
pre-proceedings phase.94  No one can be confident that counsel 
has the requisite understanding of a foreign language speaking 
client and his or her background if an interpreter is not 
engaged from the outset.  Second, not only should the habeas 
petition form include a question about the petitioner’s native 
language, but forms themselves should also be available in 
foreign languages (which could be translated for the court) in 
order to assist the court in determining the merits and 
timeliness of such petitions.  Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 to include such requirements.  Third, the court must 
establish more streamlined requirements in cases involving a 
foreign language speaking party.  This does not downplay the 
importance of case-by-case analysis, but rather creates a level 
of certainty that attorneys can better grasp when advising 
foreign language speaking clients.  The case law following such 
requirements will provide an important first step to better 
understanding the relationship between constitutional 
requirements as they apply to foreign language speakers and 
the criminal justice system going forward.  It is a first step that 
is long overdue. 
 
94 See Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching out to the Most Insular Minorities: A Proposal 
for Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C. R.-C. L. 
L. REV. 543, 573 (2004). 
